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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The modern limitations on the extension of the rule seem to be returning
the majority of American jurisdictions to a use of the privilege in its
original meaning-the excluding of testimonial utterances made under com-
pulsion. But a more precise interpretation of "testimonial" is being ob-
tained. Whereas any speaking or writing was originally considered ipso
facto testimonial, the courts now seem to distinguish between questioning
for the purposes of identification or observation and questioning for the
purpose of obtaining information.13 In the instant case there was compul-
sory questioning, but the court did not consider its nature. It merely ruled
that compulsory "demonstrations" violated the privilege against self-in-
crimination. Thus, the court seems to have followed the older American
view of the rule against self-incrimination by basing its decision on the
factor of compulsion alone.14 D. A.
FEDERAL COURTS-APPEAL IN DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP CASES--RETRo-
SPECTEVE APPLICATION OF CHANGE IN STATE LAW UNDER Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins-[United States].-An employee sued his employer in the federal
district court in Ohio, alleging negligence resulting in occupational disease.
Under the then existing state law, plaintiff had no cause of action and the
trial court dismissed the petition. Pending hearing on appeal from the
order of dismissal, the state supreme court overruled its previous decisions
so as to allow actions of the sort plaintiff sought to bring. The circuit
court of appeals held that the state law obtaining at the time of the trial
was the law of the case. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United
States held: The state law as changed by the highest state court must be
given effect on appeal, so that the order of dismissal, though correct when
made, must be reversed and plaintiff's action reinstated. Vandenbark v.
Owens-Illinois Glass Co.'
When there is a change in the law between trial and appeal, there are
two possible courses. Either the law and facts existing at the time of trial
must be considered as a unit, so that a change in the law will not change
the law of the case, or the intervening change in the law must be given
retrospective effect and so control the outcome. The general rule in the
13. United States v. Mullaney (C. C. 1887) 32 Fed. 370; Bradford v.
People (1896) 22 Colo. 157, 43 Pac. 1013; State v. McKowen (1910) 126 La.
1075, 53 So. 353. See 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 375, sec. 2265:
"Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication, written or oral,
upon which reliance is to be placed as involving his consciousness of the
facts and the operations of his mind in expressing it, the demand made
upon him is not a testimonial one."
14. Several jurisdictions approve of compulsory examinations to de-
termine intoxication. State v. Gatton (1938) 60 Ohio App. 192, 20 N. E.(2d) 265. See: State v. Duguid (1937) 50 Ariz. 276, 72 P. (2d) 435; Noe
v. Monmouth County Court (C. P. 1928) 6 N. J. Misc. 1016; Schmidt v.
District Atty. (1938) 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 787, 255 App. Div. 353. Cf. People v.
Henry (1937) 23 Cal. App. (2d) 155, 72 P. (2d) 915. For a thorough study
of the problem, see Ladd and Gibson, The Medico-Legal Aspects of Blood
Tests to Determine Intoxication (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev. 191.
1. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 347.
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state courts is that an overruling decision is to be given retrospective appli-
cation so as to control cases then pending on appeal 2 But this rule applies
only if the overruling decision involves a matter of substantive law. If it
relates to a matter of procedure it is given prospective effect only.8 Also,
a well established exception is made when contract or property rights were
acquired in reliance on an existing state of the decisions or construction of
a statute or constitutional provision.4
The rules applied by the federal courts cannot be stated so simply. Be-
fore Eiie R. R. v. Tompkins, in cases originating in the federal courts and
involving only federal questions, a change in the federal law was given
retrospective application.6 And when certiorari to a state supreme court
was granted to review a federal question, an intervening change of decision
by the Supreme Court of the United States was given retrospective applica-
tion.7 But this rule was not limited to changes in the federal law. Any
change in the applicable state law which affected the outcome of the case
was given effect by the Supreme Court.8 In cases arising in the federal
courts because of diversity of citizenship, there were two rules. When the
suit involved a matter of "general" law, a change in federal law was given
retrospective effect. 9 But when the suit involved a matter which was for-
merly regarded as "local" law, the Supreme Court at different times has fol-
lowed opposite rules. For many years the rule was that the federal court did
not have to give retrospective effect to an intervening state decision. 0 Then
2. O'Malley v. Sims (1938) 51 Ariz. 155, 75 P. (2d) 50, 115 A. L. R. 634;
Pearson v. Orcutt (1920) 107 Kan. 305, 191 Pac. 286; Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Scanlon (1936) 266 Ky. 785, 100 S. W. (2d) 223, Donohue
v. Russell (1933) 264 Mich. 217, 249 N. W. 830; Klocke v. Klocke (1919)
276 Mo. 572, 208 S. W. 825; Ross v. Board of Chosen Freeholders (1917) 90
N. X. Law 522, 102 At. 397; People ex rel. Rice v. Graves (1934) 242 App.
Div. 128, 273 N. Y. S. 582. See also Note (1938) 25 Va. L. Rev. 210.
3. Barker v. St. Louis County (1937) 340 Mo. 986, 104 S. W. (2d) 371;
Koebel v. Tieman Coal & Material Co. (1935) 337 Mo. 561, 85 S. W. (2d)
519; Newberry v. St. Louis (Mo. App. 1937) 109 S. W. (2d) 876.
4. Cooper v. Hawkins (1937) 234 Ala. 636, 176 So. 329; O'Malley v.
Sims (1938) 51 Ariz. 155, 75 P. (2d) 50, 115 A. L. R. 634; World Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Tapp (1939) 279 Ky. 423, 130 S. W. (2d) 848; Donohue
v. Russell (1933) 264 Mich. 217, 249 N. W. 830; State ex rel. May Depart-
ment Stores Co. v. Haid (1931) 327 Mo. 567, 38 S. W. (2d) 44; Klocke v.
Klocke (1918) 276 Mo. 572, 208 S. W. 825; Eberle v. Koplar 4Mo. App.
1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 919; People ex rel. Rice v. Graves (1934) 242 App.
Div. 128, 273 N. Y. S. 582.
5. (1938) 304 U. S. 64.
6. United States v. Schooner Peggy (U. S. 1801) 1 Cranch 103; Dins-
more v. Southern Express Co. (1901) 183 U. S. 115; Board of Public
Utility Comm'rs v. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (1919) 249
U. S. 425.
7. Dorchy v. Kansas (1924) 264 U. S. 286.
8. Gulf, Colo. & S. F. Ry. v. Dennis (1912) 224 U. S. 503; Missouri ex
rel. Wabash Ry. v. Public Service Comm. (1927) 273 U. S. 126.
9. Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca (1918) 248 U. S. 9.
10. Pease v. Peck (U. S. 1855) 18 How. 595; Morgan v. Curtenious (U.
S. 1857) 20 How. 1; Roberts v. Bolles (1879) 101 U. S. 119; Burgess v.
Seligman (1882) 107 U. S. 20.
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the Court changed its position and provided that the federal courts must
give retrospective effect to overruling decisions of the state courts."1 The
Court then reverted to its former ruling and provided that the federal courts
did not have to give retrospective application to intervening decisions of
the state court so as to "make that erroneous which was not so when the
judgment of that court [federal trial court] was given."' 2 And recently
the Court again changed its position, this time holding not only that the
state law should govern, but also that action should be brought in the state
court to determine the state law."3 Added to this confusion was the doctrine
of Gelpcke v. Dubuque,'4 which held that when contracts had been entered
into, or property rights acquired, in reliance on the previously existing law,
the intervening state decision was not to be given retrospective application
so as to prejudice these rights.
The rule of the Erie case pertains only to those diversity of citizenship
cases which, under the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,". were formerly regarded
as subject to decision by federal common law rules. It is in this class that
the principal case falls. But the basis for the holding was not clearly
stated. It is apparent that the federal court did not apply, as substantive
law, a state rule of retrospective application, since no discussion of the
state rule is to be found in the opinion. It is a reasonable interpretation
of the case to say that the federal court was applying a federal rule as to
retrospective application.' 6 If this was the true basis of the decision, the
question may be asked why the federal courts should adopt their own rule
in a diversity of citizenship case. What would happen if the state rule were
otherwise? This raises the problem whether the rule itself is one of sub-
stance or procedure. If one of procedure, the federal courts would be justi-
fied, under Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, in adopting their own rule;' 7 but if one
of substance, the federal courts would have to apply the state rule, though
it differed from their own.' 8
The Court, near the end of its opinion,' 9 stated what may be a different
11. Bauserman v. Blunt (1893) 147 U. S. 647; Sioux County v. National
Surety Co. (1928) 276 U. S. 238.
12. Concordia Ins. Co. v. School District (1931) 282 U. S. 545.
13. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. (1940) 309 U. S. 478. This
case involved title to realty which previous to the Erie case was considered
a matter of "local" law. Since the state law was already binding upon the
federal courts in such a situation, the Erie case had no application.
14. (U. S. 1863) 1 Wall. 175. This case was followed in Douglass v. Pike
(1879) 101 U. S. 677; Taylor v. Ypsilanti (1881) 105 U. S. 60; Anderson
v. Santa Anna (1886) 116 U. S. 356; Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees
(1900) 179 U. S. 472. See also Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Over-
ruling Decisions (1940) 35 Ill. L. Rev. 121.
15. (U. S. 1842) 16 Pet. 1.
16. Some weight is lent to this interpretation by the Court's apparent
reliance upon the rule announced in United States v. Schooner Peggy (U. S.
1801) 1 Cranch 103, although that case involved a purely federal question.
17. Sampson v. Channell (C. C. A. 1, 1940) 110 F. (2d) 754, 128 A. L. R.
394.
18. Ibid. See Note, Burden of Proof in Federal Conflict of Laws Situa-
tions-Sampson v. Channell (1941) 26 WASHINGTON U. LAW QUARTERLY
244.
19. Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co. (1941) 61 S. Ct. 347, 350.
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basis for its decision: that under the Rules of Decision Act2O the federal
courts must, at a given moment, apply the then controlling decision of the
highest state court. If this is true, what has happened to the doctrine of
the Gelpeke case,2 1 the so-called "contract exception," which is the rule in
many states as well as in the federal courts?22
Although the Court attempted in the instant case to resolve the con-
fusion in the federal cases, the opinion actually added to it by stating two
distinct grounds for the holding, since the choice of one or the other
rationale may impel opposite holdings in particular cases. A sounder view
would seem to be that a state's rule as to retrospective application of over-
ruling decisions is a part of its substantive law within the rule of the E ie
case and, as such, must be followed by the federal courts in diversity cases.
This view would be in harmony with the effort of the Court in the Erie
case to eliminate substantial disparities between the state courts and federal
courts sitting in matters governed by state law. M. D. C.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-AVOIDING FEDERAL JURISDICTION-ASSIGNMENT TO
PREVENT DIVERSITY OF CITIENHI-[Federal].-A policy of insurance was
issued by defendant company, an English corporation. For the sole purpose
of keeping an action on the policy in the Missouri courts, the heirs of the
beneficiary assigned their rights to plaintiff, a citizen of England and a
resident of Missouri. By the terms of the assignment, the assignee was to
file suit or othervise compromise the claim under the policy, receive any
money that might be paid on the claim, pay expenses incurred in the collec-
tion of the money, and hold the residue of any money thus received in trust
for the heirs. Suit was therefore filed in the state court, which granted
defendant's petition for removal to the federal court on the ground that
there was diversity of citizenship between the heirs and the corporation
and that the assignment was a sham to prevent removal. Plaintiff moved
to remand. Held: Motion granted. The practice of avoiding the jurisdic-
tion of federal courts by an assignment to prevent diversity of citizenship
is recognized and approved. Daldy v. The Ocean Accident and Guarantee
Corp.'
By the Judiciary Act of 1875,2 the federal courts are compelled to dis-
miss or remand a case if it appears that a colorable assignment or joinder
has been made for the purpose of giving them jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court has, however, established the general rule that a colorable assign-
ment for the purpose of keeping an action out of the federal courts may
20. 28 U. S. C. A. (1928) sec. 725: "Laws of States as rules of decision.
The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decisions in trials at common law, in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
21. See cases cited supra note 14.
22. See cases cited supra note 4.
1. (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1941) unreported.
2. Act of March 3, (1875) 18 Stat. 470, c. 137, 28 U. S. C. A. (1928)
sec. 80.
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